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This paper contrasts the handling, provenance, and application of the Ba’ath Party
Archives with that of the Cambodian Khmer Rouge Records. While similar in many facets, the
events surrounding the Ba’ath Party Archives received heavy ridicule while the international
community largely supported the handling of the Khmer Rouge records. The comparison of the
Cambodian and Iraqi case studies’ distinct differences reveal why international opinion varies.
It also emphasizes a gap within standard understanding concerning archival law and practices.
This exploration will reveal that current archival dialogue focuses too much on a dichotomous
relationship between international and national concerns. The author posits that cultural
accessibility is a shared concern and a more important standard when deciding on a strategy for
addressing disputed archives.




The archival principle of inalienability determines that the records of governmental
institutions belong within the official archives of the state; however, the rising prevalence of
destructive wars, civil unrest, and unstable governments have raised concerns about blanket
adherence to inalienability. Modern archivists and institutions increasingly find themselves in
precarious situations where the best practice for the preservation and accessibility of archives
remains disputed within standard archival traditions. One of the most complicated situations
arises with the fall of dictatorial governments whose records contain key evidence concerning
human rights violations and war crimes. Amidst a country damaged by invasion, war, and
unrest, archival contents risk destruction and loss of evidence against the authoritative regime.
As demonstrated by the occurrences in 2003 Iraq and 1980’s Cambodia, records often
get collected by another country's government or private entity. Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party
Records and Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge records both originated in an authoritarian dictatorship
then were jeopardized by foregin intervention, and in the name of preservation collected by a
U.S. private organization. While similar in many facets, the handling of the Iraqi archive
received heavy derision while the international community largely supported the handling of
the Khmer Rouge Records. What makes the international response to these two chains of
events so different? An in-depth analysis of the events surrounding the Iraqi Ba’ath Party and
Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge archives raises important questions for how inalienability gets
applied within complicated socio-political situations, especially concerning international versus
national claims. Additionally, the viable strategy of cultural accessibility for protecting cultural
property in these situations that prioritizes preservation of the materials and access to the
archives will be developed.
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The Ba’ath Party Archives: Provenance & Use
In 2003, following the US-led invasion of Iraq, the Iraq Memory Foundation (IMF)
acquired the Ba’ath Party records.1 The IMF was founded by Kanan Makiya, an Iraqi exile and
scholar who wished to create a memorial within Baghdad to “preserve the historical record of
thirty-eight years of Ba’thist Rule, educate Iraqis on human rights and help them come to terms
with their past.” 2 With political connections to the White House as a key supporter of the Iraq
war, Makiya “registered the group as a private American contractor and entered Iraq to rescue
Saddam Hussein’s documentary legacy of atrocity.” 3 In return for helping fund Makiya’s plan,
the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) entered into an agreement with the IMF. The DOD
allowed Makiya to collect abandoned Ba’ath Party records with the provision that he preserved
them to showcase the atrocities committed under Saddam Hussein’s regime. Under a
subsequent contractual agreement in 2005, the DOD transported and digitized the documents to
the US before transferring them solely into the IMF’s control.4 Makiya then entered into an
arrangement with Stanford’s Hoover Institute (HI) in 2008 where the archives were housed for
research purposes.5 Since that agreement, only in-person access at the HI existed, meaning no
widespread Iraqi access was developed. Since the 2015 closing of the US Conflict Records
Research Center, a research center created solely to provide access to Ba’ath Party records, the
HI’s archives became the only available database for Saddam’s regime in the world.6 No
accessibility for Iraqi citizens or other researchers existed unless they were able to travel to
6 Brill, Michael P. “Setting the Records Straight in Iraq” July 17, 2020.
5 Michelle Caswell, “‘Thank You Very Much, Now Give Them Back’: Cultural Property and the Fight over the
Iraqi Baath Party Records.” The American Archivist 74, no. 1 (2011), 212
4 Montgomery “Immortality in the Secret Police Files,” 316.
3 Bruce P. Montgomery, “Immortality in the Secret Police Files: The Iraq Memory Foundation and the Baath Party
Archive.” International Journal of Cultural Property 18, no. 3 (2011), 311.
2 Wisam H. Alshaibi,  “Weaponizing Iraq's Archives.” Middle East Report, 2019, 291 edition.
1 Sarah Wilkinson,  “Who Owns These Records? Authority, Ownership, and Custody of Iraq's Baath Party
Records.” RBM: A Journal of Rare Books, Manuscripts, and Cultural Heritage 20, 28.
Thompson 4
Stanford. In the summer of 2020, the Ba’ath Party Archives returned to Iraq with digitized
copies remaining at the HI; however, public access in Iraq has yet to be granted.
The movement of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party archives into the US reveals two of their uses
by the American government and its private contractor, the IMF. The first function arose as
captured military intelligence that served immediate use. The records consisted of paperwork,
membership files, regime information, and security service surveillance on political figures and
normal citizens.7 The IMF gained funding by appealing to the DOD and emphasizing the
records’ information about the structure of the rebel insurgency.8 This appeal classified the
archives as ‘potential intelligence’ making the funding and transfer to the US possible;
however, this classification directly contradicted the IMF’s statement to the Iraqi Prime
Minister’s office that defined the records as ‘cultural material’; a classification that allowed for
the IMF’s handling of the archives under Iraqi law.9 Thus, the IMF exploited the Ba’ath Party
record’s classification to get them transferred out of Iraq and onto US soil.  In consequence, this
agreement linked the IMF with the United States due to the funds provided by the DOD.
Their immediate use as potential evidence in trials concerning human rights violations
and war crimes also motivated their preservation. Directly following the invasion of Iraq in
March of 2003, the Human Rights Watch asked the US military to protect records so they might
be used in future war crime trials.10 However, if the IMF or US military wanted to protect
records to prosecute Hussien’s allies, “their provenance, and the subsequent agreement with the
Hoover Institution might call into their question their admissibility as evidence in a human
10 Caswell “Thank You Very Much,”  216.
9 Montgomery “Immortality in the Secret Police Files,” 315.
8 Montgomery “Immortality in the Secret Police Files,” 316.
7 Brill “Setting the Records Straight in Iraq.”
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rights trial.”11 The unusual provenance of the records alerted JAG12 officers to potential issues
concerning chain of custody questioning. It was also unclear whether either the prosecution or
defense of Hussein and other Ba’ath Party members had access to the materials, a potential
legal issue in court.13 As use as evidence in human rights trials serves as one of the strongest
legal reasons allowing for the transfer of cultural property outside of their native nation (to
prevent destruction from the charged party), the IMF and the Pentagon jeopardized their role as
evidence by triaging the documents for intelligence.
However, the main use of the Ba’ath Party archives revolved around a DOD led
propaganda campaign to justify the war in Iraq. One of the few researchers with access to the
entirety of the IMF records, Wisam Alshaibi, interviewed Undersecretary of Defense Douglas
Feith concerning the use of intelligence gained from the archive. As a member of the Bush
administration, Feith was one of the main architects of the Iraq War. Within the interview,
Alshaibi asked Feith “if efforts to bring Iraqi records to the United States were part of a
strategic influence campaign” and Feith confidently affirmed this view.14 In response to a
discussion about a project to crowdsource information concerning Iraq, Feith said its strategic
importance revolved around demonstrating and affirming to the public the justness of the US
invasion of Iraq based on Ba’ath Party atrocities. This statement reveals the White House’s
explicit mission to justify the Iraq war.  Feith went on to say that “atrocities were a part of this
fight.”15 The internal memo from the DOD titled “Plan for Publicizing Iraqi Atrocities”
confirms this motivation as it discusses “the strategic information campaign” utilizing the
15 Alshaibi “Weaponizing Iraqi’s Archives.”
14 Alshaibi “Weaponizing Iraqi’s Archives.”
13 Caswell “Thank You Very Much,” 229.
12 JAG: Judge Advocate Generals Corp
11 Caswell “Thank You Very Much,”  229.
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Ba’ath Party Archives.16 Through his interviews with Feith and Alshaibi’s access to DOD
memos, he concluded that “the Ba’th Party archives in the United States are not merely inert
bounties of war, but in their capacity to produce a historical record they are active participants
in a long-term policy objective of justifying US military interventions in Iraq.”17
This use of Ba’ath Party Archives for foreign military and political gain reveals a
disregard for the national importance of the archives in trials and reconciliation. Yet, Makiya’s
original goal to create a memorial center in Iraq demonstrates an understanding of the
importance of national records for healing. The IMF’s actions directly supporting the
international use of the Ba’ath Party records reveals a disregard for the Iraqi significance of the
records. Thus, the situation surrounding the Ba’ath Party Archives demonstrates a tension
between the international and national use of cultural property.
The Ba’ath Party Archives: World Opinions
Judgements on the handling of the Ba’ath Party archives mainly focus on the legal
rights to the records. Critics of the IMF’s actions cite the seizure of the records as violating
multiple international protocols that protect cultural property and prohibit wartime pillaging.
While the exact legal right of the Ba’ath Party records under the Hague and UNESCO
Conventions is murky, the Society of American Archivists (SAA) and the Association of
Canadian Archives (ACA) issued a joint statement in 2008 condemning the IMF by citing
international laws.18
Saad Eskander, the former director of the Iraq National Library and Archive, strongly
criticized the situation around the Ba’ath Party Archives. Eskander accused the IMF of acting
18ACA and SAA. “ACA/SAA Joint Statement on Iraqi Records.” Society of American Archivists, April 22, 2008.
17 Alshaibi “Weaponizing Iraqi’s Archives.”
16 Alshaibi “Weaponizing Iraqi’s Archives.”
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with solely political motivations. He denounced Makiya for exploiting the “chaotic situation at
the top [of the 2003 Iraqi interim government] and the ignorance of some of the newly
appointed Iraqi officials to get approval for the shipment of the records to the US.”19 In another
interview, Eskander reminded the public the IMF was created “within the framework of the
American occupation of Iraq, and this was an integral part of a grand imperial vision for the
New Iraq. This explains why the IMF has not been accountable politically, administratively,
legally, financially or morally to any Iraqi authority since its formation”.20 Thus, Eskander
opposes the IMF’s possession of the archives as he believes the organization exploited the
vulnerable Iraqi situation to serve its own political and financial goals.
However, some officials within the Iraqi government and Kanan Makiya defend the
IMF’s actions and argue consent existed. Throughout the IMF’s initial acquisition of the
archives and their journey to the HI, correspondence between Makiya and government officials
concerning the records demonstrated a level of permission. The IMF provided evidence of
various conversations with high level Iraqi government officials throughout the entire process
that provides legitimacy to the IMF’s actions. Most notably, the head of the HI and Falih
al-Fayyadn, the Iraqi National Security Council advisor signed a Memorandum of
Understanding in 2012.21 The memorandum established three main principles. First, it
confirmed that the Ba’ath Party Archives belong to the Iraqi people. Second, the HI was
officially adopted as the external center for depositing the Iraq records. Third, the Iraqi
government, not the IMF,  controls all important decisions concerning the documents.22
22 Almeadi “US Hoover Institution Documents Return to Iraq.”
21 Almeadi, Jamal. “US Hoover Institution Documents Return to Iraq: The Tale of the Ba'th Regional Command
Archive.” Daraj, August 31, 2020. https://daraj.com/en/53961/.
20 Saad Eskander, “Saad Eskander's Open Letter to the Hoover Institution,” June 21, 2008.
19 Montgomery “Immortality in the Secret Police Files,” 318.
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Additionally, those supporting the IMF cite the records’ potential importance in
international criminal courts. However, as discussed earlier the IMF jeopardized that possibility
through their agreement with the DOD. In the two decades since,  no United Nations tribunals
have requested the use of these Ba’ath Party records. Thus, the potential legal benefits of the
records in that context have become almost obsolete.
Khmer Rouge Records: Provenance And Use
From 1975 to 1979, the reign of the Khmer Rouge left Cambodia racked with the
effects of an unstable government and a nation-wide genocide. From documentation of their
executions and detailed forced confessions to high-level correspondence and party directives,
the Khmer Rouge obsessively recorded all governmental proceedings. With the invasion of
Vietnam in 1979 and the gradual end of the Democratic Kampuchea era (DK) the records of the
regime scattered across Cambodia. With no other entity trying to, the Documentation Center of
Cambodia (DC-Cam) began to collect Khmer Rouge records in the 1990’s.
The DC-Cam, an organization created out of Yale’s Cambodian Genocide Program,
later became an independent nonprofit under Youk Chhang, a Khmer Rouge refugee in
America.23 DC-Cam’s self-pronounced mission “[First] is to record and preserve the history of
the Khmer Rouge regime for future generations. The second is to compile and organize
information that can serve as potential evidence in a legal accounting for the crimes of the
Khmer Rouge''.24 Throughout the collection process of the Khmer Rouge records and their
subsequent applications, DC-Cam proceeded with transparency. DC-Cam understood the
24 Robert Carmichael, Andrew Haffner, Wanpen Pajai, Agence France-Presse, Andi Hajramurni and Dessy
Sagita/AFP, and Agence France-Presse. “How DC-Cam Helped Convict the Khmer Rouge.” Southeast Asia
Globe, November 18, 2019
23 Michelle Caswell, “Rethinking Inalienability: Trusting Nongovernmental Archives in Transitional Societies.”
The American Archivist 76, no. 1 (2013), 116.
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importance of a record collection for future trials, and “the failure to establish a court sooner
meant that DC-Cam had no real alternative but to construct a record independently.”25
United Nations-backed human rights trials against the regime used the records collected
and processed by DC-Cam. The organization of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal took decades to
organize due to complicated geo politics and only in 2006 they began.26 DC-Cam provided
80% of court documents, which proved instrumental in the conviction of one of the most
notorious leaders of the Khmer Rouge: Kang Kek Lew, better known as Commander Duch.27
Members of the prosecution claim that the tribunal may not have existed without DC-Cam’s
gathering of important records from the regime.28 The head of DC-Cam asserted  that without
the information provided by the organization, the UN would not have chosen to go forward
with the tribunal.29 Thus, the importance of DC-Cam acquiring the records cannot be
understated concerning the trials condemning the human rights violations of the Khmer Rouge.
Since their use in the tribunals, these records remain housed within the DC-Cam’s
archives in Phnom Penh fully accessible to the public for research and awareness. As of 2021,
the DC-Cam retains full authority over these materials. A key detail being that no outside
nation or Cambodia itself funds the DC-Cam, as an independent organization it maintains full
authority over the narratives it tells and how it uses the materials. With their resources, they
created both a Public Information Room, a recently opened public library in Phnom Penh, and
traveling exhibitions detailing survivor testimonials.  These resources offer online access for
29 Carmichael et al. “How DC-Cam Helped.”
28 Carmichael et al. “How DC-Cam Helped.”
27 Carmichael et al. “How DC-Cam Helped.”
26 Alexander Hinton, The Justice Facade: Trials of Transition in Cambodia. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2018. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2018.
25 Andrew Mamo, “History and the Boundaries of Legality: Historical Evidence at the ECCC.”  (May, 2013), 25.
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10985172
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both Cambodians and international researchers to all the records they collected in addition to
other sources about the Khmer Rouge.30
Khmer Rouge Records: World Opinions
A complicated and controversial relationship between DC-Cam and the present
Cambodian government exists. During and closely following their collection of the records in
the 1990’s, DC-Cam received support from the Cambodian government. Hun Sen, who seized
control of Cambodia in 1999 and maintains power since, led a government that “has been
plagued by corruption allegations, accusations of fiscal mismanagement, and charges of human
rights abuses. Prime Minister Hun Sen is widely accused of perpetrating violence against his
political opponents, rigging elections, and most recently, attempting to destroy the country’s
flourishing city society organizations”.31 That instability combined with Hun Sen’s aversion
towards civil society organizations makes DC-Cam’s political situation uncertain.
As Hun Sen wavers on whether he wants to remember or obliterate the Khmer Rouge
regime from popular memory, the DC-Cam’s safety remains in jeopardy for two main reasons.
First, their records hold political ammunition that could be used against Hun Sen’s regime. For
example, evidence within the DC-Cam’s possession could implicate multiple current colleagues
of Hun Sen.32 As much of Hun Sen’s legitimacy grew out of his political party’s resistance to
the Khmer Rouge, the DC-Cam records could disrupt Hun Sen’s carefully constructed
narrative.33 This political ammunition alone puts the Khmer Rouge records into a precarious
situation. Second, Hun Sen famously said “Dig a hole and bury the past in it” when discussing
33 Savina Sirik, “Memory Construction of Former Khmer Rouge Cadres: Resistance to Dominant Discourses of
Genocide in Cambodia.” Journal of Political Power 13, no. 2 (2020): 233
32 Caswell “Rethinking Inalienability,”  119.
31 Caswell “Rethinking Inalienability,” 118.
30 Caswell “Rethinking Inalienability,” 123.
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reconciliation with former Khmer Rouge members.34 This method of censoring history directly
contradicts DC-Cam’s mission to reach reconciliation by raising awareness through education.
Comparing Ba’ath Party and Khmer Rouge Archives: Treatment and Use
The case studies of the Ba'ath Party and Khmer Rouge Archives individually reveal
interesting decisions and applications of international archival standards; however, an in depth
comparison reveals how inadequate and variable the application of archival standards is to
these complex situations.  Important distinctions concerning archival standards arise by
comparing the organization’s outreach efforts, the access to the archives, and the NGO’s
relationship with the government.
The efforts taken by the organization to open the records up for international and
Iraqi/Cambodian remembrance stands as a stark contrast.  DC-Cam committed itself to serve
and support the Cambodian people, while the IMF failed to carry through with any of its global
and national outreach. During the Iraq war, Makiya asked the American military to turn over
captured materials to him with the aim of making them part of his memorial center; however, as
of present no such memorial center exists, in or outside of Iraq.  In contrast, DC-Cam
established a memorial center in the heart of Cambodia and continues its commitment to serve
the community. This memorial center includes the Public Information Room and the recently
opened library. Alongside those establishments, the organization remains extremely transparent
about how the donations they receive benefit the local community and the utilization of the
Khmer Rouge records. 35 The DC-Cam hosted multiple exhibitions by the mass grave site at
Wat Themi and at the last Khmer Rouge stronghold in Anlong Veng. 36 These exhibitions,
36 Sirik “Memory Construction,” 140.
35 Montgomery “Immortality in the Secret Police Files,”  313.
34 Sirik “Memory Construction,”  145.
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created and funded by the DC-Cam as educational tools,  inform Cambodians and visitors
about the untold narratives of the Khmer Rouge. In stark contrast to the US propaganda
supported by the IMF, the exhibitions DC-Cam developed emphasized stories that harshly
contrasted the narratives that the Cambodian government pushed onto its people.37
In addition to the original records collected, both organizations sponsored the recording
of survivor testimonials. During the Khmer Rouge United Nations tribunals, the DC-Cam set
up public forums around Cambodia to allow survivors to record their own experiences.38 Public
access to these oral histories, stored within the archives, continues. This project emphasizes
DC-Cam’s commitment to recording and preserving the atrocities endured by the Cambodian
people.  No record exists of the Cambodian government attempting to hijack the Khmer Rouge
testimonials for any self-serving purpose.
Similarly, the IMF’s Iraqi Testimonials Project documented atrocities suffered by the
Iraqi people under Saddam Hussein. Carefully edited interviews from the Iraqi Testimonials
Project aired on Iraqi national television for four seasons between 2005-2008 as a propaganda
campaign to further vilify all aspects of Saddam Hussein’s reign.39 The CIA created the edited
version and crafted the videos to directly align with the US’s previously discussed propaganda
campaign.40 The comparison of the two programs reveals the key difference between the IMF
and DC-Cam’s purpose. Through the oral history campaign, the IMF alongside the American
government weaponized the Iraqi people and their stories to support the US propaganda
40 Thompson, interview.
39 Elizabeth Thompson, Video interview to Wisam Alshaibi. Wisam Alshaibi on Ba'ath Party Archives.
May 5, 2020.
Brill, Michael P. “War on Rocks: Texas National Security Review,” July 17, 2020.
38 Caswell “Rethinking Inalienability,” 123
37 Sirik “Memory Construction,” 145.
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initiative. In comparison, DC-Cam’s focus on purely preserving the voices of the Cambodian
people for future generations and to bring their ousted tyrants to justice.
The political relationship between the organization and the government in question
exposes the largest difference between the two situations. Much controversy occurred
concerning the level of support Iraqi officials gave to the CPA to transfer Iraqi cultural property
into private hands, and what rights the US had to transfer Iraqi cultural property outside of the
country. Since 2003 controversy persisted over the legality of the US actions regarding the
Ba’ath Party Archives, as well as disagreement over to what extent Iraq gave consent to the
transference of its records. The 2012 Memorandum cleared up a lot of this confusion, but many
still criticize the IMF’s past actions. For example, many criticize the funding the IMF took from
the US, a foreing invading government, during the Iraq war. This funding contrasts the
DC-Cam’s situation as the DC-Cam maintains its own autonomy.
Unlike the Khmer Rouge records which remain under the authority of DC-Cam, control
of the Ba’ath Party Archives returned to the Iraqi government following the 2012
Memorandum.  And their physical return occured in the Summer of 2020. This return was
viewed as a win by many who opposed the IMF’s handling; however the continued lack of
access remains detrimental for the Iraqi people.
Implications For Archival Standards:
Cultural Nationalism Vs. Internationalism
As explored above, historical evidence and primary sources hold importance for the
national and international community. Two main epistemologies appear when discussing cases
about cultural property and archival standards: cultural nationalism and cultural
internationalism.   “Cultural nationalism” links cultural property as inalienable property of a
nation’s cultural history. In contrast, “cultural internationalism” views cultural property as a
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part of the global human culture.41 The investigation into the Ba’ath Party Archives and Khmer
Rouge records reveals a dilemma surrounding cultural property: to what extent should cultural
nationalism versus internationalism be followed?
As argued by proponents of the IMF and DC-CAM, cultural property belongs to a
shared human culture and thus historical objects must be protected for the international
community. The 1954 Hague Convention established legal precedent for cultural
internationalism and the SAA repeatedly echoes the importance of worldwide cultural property:
“once destroyed, archives cannot be re-created and the cultural patrimony of the world is
permanently diminished”.42
The complicated socio-political world we live in necessitates the study of history and
attention to diverse accounts of the past. Resources like the Ba’ath Party records and the Khmer
Rouge archives provide rich educational opportunities for people to learn about governments
and communities both very similar and quite different from their own. Having access to
personal oral histories as both the DC-Cam and IMF crafted creates a human connection
between modern historians and people separated by time, space, and culture. Without resources
like those oral histories, it is very easy to alienate historical figures which prevents the
development of empathy. Without the ability to empathize with those different from you,
conflict and strife over differences becomes exasperated. Within his book Why Study History,
John Fea emphasizes the importance of empathy as it leads to humility. Fea discusses that
“humility is ultimately an acknowledgment of one’s limits and the realization that there are
some things about the world that we cannot know fully”.43 Thus, international access to a
43 John Fea, Why Study History?: Reflecting on the Importance of the Past (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic,
2013), 61.
42 Douglas “National Archives and International Conflicts,” 454.
41 Douglas Cox, “National Archives and International Conflicts: The Society of American Archivists and War.”
The American Archivist 74, no. 2 (2011), 454.
Thompson 15
variety of historical sources prevents the arrogance of superiority that threatens to alienate one
community from another. The cross-cultural educational opportunities of the two archives
serves as a strong argument for the cultural internationalism theory.
Within the context of Iraq and Cambodia, the current state of their country raises
questions in favor of following cultural internationalism. For instance, the instability of
Cambodia’s political situation and Hun Sen’s motivations to suppress Khmer Rouge history
makes the preservation of the records in a Cambodian government archive difficult. In her
article “Rethinking Inalienability: Trusting Nongovernmental Archives in Transitional
Societies,” Michelle Caswell details why this archive should not be transferred into the sole
custody of the Cambodian government:
Against this backdrop of political chaos, interference with civil society, and
financial mismanagement, government-run agencies in Cambodia are simply not
stable enough right now to properly steward records of recent human rights abuse.
Furthermore, government-run archival institutions in Cambodia are so underfunded
that they currently lack the capacity to care for an influx of records44
Thus, the Khmer Rouge records do not necessarily have a reliable or safe home within the
Cambodian government. This same argument could be made concerning the position of the
Ba’ath Party Archives in Iraq. Just as access problems would arise with the transfer of the
records to the Cambodian government, since the return of the Ba’ath Party Archives no public
access has been given.
However, critics of both the IMF and DC-Cam claim that even if scholars are unsure of
how safe the records may be, outside powers should not determine where a country’s cultural
property belongs. This point of view coincides with the cultural nationalism epistemology.  In
44 Caswell “Rethinking Inalienability,” 120.
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an article concerning the Ba’ath Party Archives, Michelle Caswell vocalizes her support of
their repatriation:
“Protection means control”, and control that calls into question the sovereignty of
source nations. This is not to say that the IMF did not initially protect the records
from destruction, which it did, but rather, once the initial act of protection is
complete, the records should be repatriated as soon as possible. Failure to do so is a
failure to acknowledge the power inequalities inherent in their acquisition45
This statement specifically concerns the Iraqi archives but also applies to the situation with
Cambodia. Regardless of the current socio-political unease in Cambodia, the “initial act of
protection” by the DC-Cam has been completed. Under this framework, both records should
technically be returned to the control of their respective government despite preservation and
access concerns.
In accordance with Caswell’s statement, Iraqi Archivist Eskander argues the Ba’ath
Party Archives belong to Iraq and the international community has no place to dictate the
provenance of inalienable cultural property.46 Eskander’s views, along with those who support
the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge Records within Cambodian authority, reflect the cultural
nationalism view. The 1970 UNESCO Convention’s “Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property” meant to protect the
authority of nations over their own objects, including archives.47 Thus, regardless of the value
of an archive to the international community, cultural property belongs within its society of
origin.
The case studies from Cambodia and Iraq both deal with the integral role public history
plays in military events and the rebuilding of a society. The same records and artifacts that an
international military campaign may utilize to gain intelligence or that an international court
47 Douglas “National Archives and International Conflicts.”
46 Eskander “Open Letter to the Hoover Institution.”
45 Caswell “Thank You Very Much, Now Give Them Back,” 235.
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uses to try criminals can be used by the victimized country to regain a sense of unity through
the atrocities they faced. Thus, a nation’s history serves as a tool in rebuilding their community.
The use of these records and oral histories by their home nations to reconcile their past
trauma and to facilitate renewal demonstrates the importance of historical inquiry within a
society. Cultural property acts as a physical embodiment of a national identity. A country must
retain access to materials from a crucial time in their past: “Crucial to the formation of a
national identity is not just the existence of a national library or archive or the ownership of
documents of national import, but access to these documents.”48 In both Cambodia and Iraq,
their people went through horrific psychological and physical events. Being able to reclaim that
part of their history by having access to their cultural property is an extremely important step in
the reconciliation process.
Setting up archival strategies along international and national lines fails to adequately
confront modern globalized problems. The international viewpoint fails to ensure national
access and the national viewpoint fails to integrate the global need to connect with international
communities. However, proponents on each side of the cultural nationalism and cultural
internationalism debate emphasize the importance of accessibility to the cultural property.
A Third Option: Cultural Accessibility
The case studies of Iraq and Cambodia revealed the complicated position archival
materials have within international politics and law.  In reference back to the currently accepted
definition of the archival principle of inalienability, which asserts the records of state and
governmental institutions belong within those nation’s archives, both the Ba’ath Party Archives
and the Khmer Rouge archives technically belong in their government’s national archive.
48 Caswell “Thank You Very Much, Now Give Them Back,” 223.
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While the Ba’ath Party Archives now reside under Iraqi control, the complicated and
controversial circumstances surrounding both collections reveals that inalienability cannot be
applied as a blanket statement within our modern political atmosphere in which the line
between nations blurs and institutional governments often fail to act in their citizen’s best
interest. As seen with both Iraq and Cambodia, their governmental records often serve as
evidence of their human rights violations and war crimes.
However, the autonomy of individual nations must be preserved to prevent an
imperialization of archives in the name of preservation. Each situation involving a toppled
government or controversial handling of cultural property transpires differently. This analysis
acknowledges that no overarching international law or regulation adequately handles every
situation; however, it is necessary to prioritize the preservation of records within their country
of origin. History reveals how often rival nations attempt to weaponize cultural property. The
DOD’s propaganda and PR agenda demonstrates this exact scenario. The opposing strategy
Caswell discusses is the repatriation of cultural property to the home country.49 Yet, the
Cambodian case study demonstrates that even decades after their acquisition, the nation’s
government may not be a safe option.
Thus, if residing under the authority of their originating government raises concerns
about the safety and integrity of the archives a third option must be developed. The
international community and archival standards should prioritize the return of cultural property
first to the originating government and second to an NGO or capable institution within the
nation.  This strategy prioritizes national (and international) access to the materials.
49 Caswell “Thank You Very Much, Now Give Them Back,” 235.
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DC-Cam, who protected and safely allowed access to valuable records throughout
volatile times, serves as a prime example of this method. As discussed above, access to
cultural property, especially in times of tribulation, greatly improves healing, reconciliation,
and growth. This scenario still allows for their use in human rights trials, a use that often
appears as a large argument for the removal of records.
The return of the Ba’ath Party Archives to Iraqi authority came as a win for cultural
nationalists; however, since their return to Iraq no access exists for Iraqis or researchers. While
under the control of the IMF and while at the HI, the limited international access to the
materials prompted protest. Yet, their repatriation and move to Iraq demonstrates that returning
cultural property to its government does not necessarily equal accessibility. The HI remains the
only place in the world granting access to the materials (through digitized copies).
Conclusion
This comparison of the Ba’ath Party Archives and Khmer Rouge Archives demonstrates
a need for future research concerning archival strategies that prioritize both national and
international access to preserved materials. Counter to standard practices that fail to adequately
approach issues in an increasingly globalized and volatile socio-political age, cultural
accessibility challenges archivists and politicians to understand the immaterial worth of cultural
property to healing nations and international relations. Both the IMF and DC-Cam interpreted
and applied archival standards and national laws differently, leading to unnecessary
complications and controversies. Thus, international archival practices need to adapt as cultural
property becomes increasingly politicized and controversial. By emphasizing the need to
provide accessibility these developing standards will ensure that archives and other cultural
property are not restricted due to political or military concerns.
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